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he digital world is changing fast; the 
computing power of today’s 
smartphones outpaces that of 
supercomputers from just twenty-five 
years ago. We can video-call people on the 
opposite side of the globe, and we trust that 
our data are transmitted securely from one 
device to another. But, given this breathless 
speed of advancement, can we maintain our 
security in the coming decades? The use of 
quantum mechanics could be the answer. Is 
the UK’s science policy up to it? 
Ensuring our digital security has never been 
a more pressing issue. The WannaCry virus 
wreaked havoc on the NHS last year, Russia 
has been the subject of numerous hacking 
allegations, and, more broadly, businesses 
suffer losses of billions of pounds annually 
as a result of hacking. Yet, on the horizon, a 
more benign threat is appearing in the form 
of quantum computers. These computers 
promise to solve problems that are currently 
intractable by modern supercomputers, 
particularly when it comes to factorising 
very large numbers - a technique that 
serves as the foundation for much of 
modern-day encryption. This would mean 
that current encryption methods, which 
would take thousands of years to crack with 
a conventional computer, could be broken in 
just seconds by a hacker using a quantum 
computer.  
Much of contemporary internet security 
rests on a technique known as ‘key 
encryption’. In  
 
general, key encryption provides security by 
encoding information that is shared between 
a receiver and transmitter using a key. The 
lynchpin of this security system stems from 
the mathematical complexity of determining 
the key. Keys are typically very large 
numbers, containing prime factors. Current 
computers struggle to extract these prime 
factors as they rely on a brute force 
approach that tests all possible combinations 
of factors, one after another. As these keys 
become larger and larger, the work required 
to crack them increases exponentially, 
quickly reaching the order of thousands of 
years.  
The advent of quantum computers, a time 
that could be anywhere from ten to fifty 
years from now, would likely upend this 
entire encryption system. Quantum 
computers derive their computational power 
from quantum bits, or ‘qubits’.  While current 
computers use classical bits, which can only 
be in one of two states, a ‘0’ or a ‘1’, qubits 
can be in both states simultaneously due to 
something known as ‘superposition’. This 
purely quantum phenomenon of existing in 
both states concurrently provides a huge 
advantage when it comes to factorisation: 
rather than trying thousands of combinations 
iteratively, quantum computer can try 
multiple combinations simultaneously. 
Although several decades may separate us 
from quantum computers, quantum 
cryptography, which exploits a different 
quantum phenomenon, Heisenberg’s 
Uncertainty Principle, is already 
T 
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commercially available in the form of a 
quantum key distribution (QKD). This 
cryptography technique encodes information 
on individual particles of light, known as 
photons. As an example, let us suppose that 
a sender, Alice, and a receiver, Bob, want to 
share a secure key. Alice prepares her 
photons and encodes information on them 
using their polarisation; she first chooses, at 
random, which basis, either horizontal-
vertical (+) or diagonal (x). Then she 
chooses which bit, ‘1’ or ‘0’ to send, where 
horizontal (H) and anti-diagonal (A) 
correspond to ‘1’ and vertical (V) and 
diagonal (D) correspond to ‘0’. She then 
sends these photons to Bob. Bob then 
chooses at random which basis to measure 
along. If he chooses correctly, he extracts 
the bit. If he chooses incorrectly, he has a 
50/50 probability of getting either a ‘1’ or 
‘0’. After this, Bob announces publicly which 
basis he used for each measurement and 
Alice responds publicly whether he chose 
the correct basis. Bob then discards all the 
bits with incorrect measurements, after 
which Alice and Bob share a common string 
of ‘1s’ and ‘0s’. They then publicly compare 
a small section of them to confirm that they 
do indeed have the same key. If an 
eavesdropper, Eve, would like to learn the 
key whilst going undetected, she can’t for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, she doesn’t 
know in advance which measurement to 
perform, so if she does an incorrect 
measurement, and then sends her own 
particle to Bob, this will introduce an error 
which can be detected by Alice and Bob 
when they compare their small selection of 
bits. Secondly, she cannot copy the photon, 
as this is physically impossible. In this way, 
Alice and Bob can share a key with perfect 
security. As such, since it is based on the 
laws of physics, quantum cryptography is 
theoretically unbreakable. Even an 
eavesdropper with an infinitely powerful 
computer, or even a quantum computer, 
could not break this means of 
communication. As other nations divert 
significant resources toward preparing for a 
quantum cryptography-era, one pressing 
question remains: has the UK kept up? 
Well, actually, the answer is mostly ‘yes’. In 
2013, the UK invested in a £270 million 
Quantum Technology Hub [1], a nationwide 
initiative of universities and industrial 
partners who are dedicated to the 
development of quantum technology. 
Comprised of four hubs, the initiative has 
specialised teams responsible for sensing, 
metrology, computing and, most importantly, 
communication. Moreover, the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) has committed £36m to the 
cause and the total investments from the 
public and private sector were estimated to 
exceed £350m this year. This hardly comes 
as a surprise since quantum technologies 
could be worth as much as the consumer 
electronics sector, which currently nets 
about £240bn a year globally [2].  
The money invested so far has produced 
significant results. One ongoing project is 
the construction of a quantum 
communications network over fibre-optics. 
This would cover southern England, with 
nodes in, among others, Bristol, Reading, 
London, Martlesham in Suffolk (specifically 
at BT) and Cambridge, which also contains 
its own metropolitan network. However, the 
UK struggles with the commercial 
realisation of QKD. Currently, the Swiss firm 
IDQuantique have cornered the market, 
having sold their own systems for several 
years. American and Australian firms, such 
as MagiQ and Quintessence, claim to provide 
systems, but details are sparse at best. 
Toshiba look poised to announce their 
entrance into the market, having 
demonstrated numerous field trials over the 
years. The company also recently broke the 
record for the fastest transfer of secure 
keys over 50 km of fibre [3]. Although 
numerous British experts undoubtedly 
provide valuable services through 
consultancy, the only firm springing out of 
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this is the Bristol-based KETS. Comprised 
of several researchers, KETS recently 
secured access to more than £125 million of 
venture capital funding at a recent start-up 
competition hosted by Facebook and BT [4]. 
Taken together, it seems the strength of 
British firms lies more in the provision of 
the components for these systems rather 
than developing the entire product 
themselves. 
 
The UK is developing a quantum network, 
with nodes in several major cities and at 
R&D centres such as Toshiba Research 
Europe Ltd (TREL) and National Physical 
Laboratory (NPL). 
Despite significant achievements, the UK 
should be hesitant to rest on its laurels, 
particularly when drawing comparisons to 
the achievements of other countries. China 
has easily led the way in terms of 
translating funding and resources into real, 
tangible results; the launch of their quantum 
satellite, Micius, catalysed their success, 
which began with the demonstration of QKD 
between Micius and a ground station, easily 
surpassing any previous distance records 
[5]. They then went even further by 
performing a quantum-secured 
intercontinental video conference between 
Beijing and Vienna, a world first [6]. This, 
coupled with their announcement of a 2000 
km long metropolitan network [7], a brand 
new quantum centre [8] and a pledge to 
create a global, quantum-secured network 
by 2030 has placed the Chinese at  the top 
of the sector. Indeed, these results have 
caused quite a stir, resulting in a number of 
countries announcing their own satellite 
projects, including Canada and Japan [9], as 
well as other more collaborative 
approaches. Despite significant progress in 
CubeSats - compact and comparatively 
cheap satellites suitable for space-based 
QKD experiments - thus far, there is no 
indication that the UK plans to follow suit. 
Undoubtedly, the uncertainty surrounding 
Brexit makes it highly unlikely that the 
enormous investment required will be 
appropriated in the near future. Indeed, the 
UK’s involvement in the €1 billion EU 
Horizon project has already come under 
question. 
The official position of the UK government 
is against implementing QKD. The National 
Cyber Security Centre, a branch of GCHQ, 
currently advises against the adoption of 
QKD due to uncertainty surrounding its 
practical security and feasibility [10]. 
However, this is not set in stone, and a 
leading science policy advisor has even 
indicated that revisions to this position are 
underway. Furthermore, significant work has 
been carried out by the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI) toward standardisation of QKD in 
anticipation of its widespread 
implementation, and the UK’s National 
Physical Laboratory (NPL) has played a key 
role in this. Such a collaboration suggests 
that QKD is gaining momentum, and the 
focus has now shifted away from proving 
theoretical security to demonstrating real-
world, practical security. This shift suggests 
QKD may be moving outside of the lab and 
into something that could soon be part of 
everyday life.  
So, what are the next steps for UK science 
policy? This will hinge upon the outcome of 
Brexit; significant research funding 
currently stems from the EU (e.g., in the 
form of the Marie Curie Fellowship), which 
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also sources many of the individuals 
currently involved in British QKD 
development. Next, as the initial funding 
phase for the four Quantum Hubs will end 
this year, policymakers must determine 
whether the funding will be extended or 
renewed. The Hubs have catalysed the 
development of several quantum technology 
clusters in York, Bristol and Cambridge, and, 
by continuing Hub funding, the UK 
government could not only grow the sector 
but also provide assurance to businesses 
that have yet to invest in quantum 
communication. Finally, Britain ranks within 
the top five in terms of spending, 
publications and patent applications in the 
area of quantum science [2], and continued 
collaborations between academia, business 
and government will ensure a strong global 
position for years to come. The age of 
quantum internet is imminent, and the UK 
must decide if it wants to continue as a 
leading player of the so-called ‘quantum 
revolution,’ or resign itself to a place on the 
sidelines. 
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